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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is ubiquitous. Over the past two decades, it has
grown and evolved, overcome boundaries, and defied containment.
The Internet can now be accessed not only through a designated
computer terminal but on any number of devices: wireless laptop
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computers, cellular telephones, e-readers, game consoles,
3
4
5
televisions, cars, and even refrigerators. Unfortunately, while the
Internet has undoubtedly made many aspects of our lives easier, it
has also provided more opportunities to run afoul of the law,
infringe intellectual property rights, and engage in tortious speech
6
and activities.
One of the predominant properties of the Internet is the
general veil of anonymity. The Internet, in contrast with the real
world, lacks many of the self-authenticating features that human
7
society has come to rely on when identifying individuals. In real
life it is difficult to disguise one’s identity, and the difficulty
increases with familiarity because familiarity brings with it
knowledge about a multitude of variables: one’s appearance, one’s
tone of voice, one’s physical movements, etc. But, on the Internet,
familiarity is usually linked to a small handful of factors—often just
8
a username and password combination. If you have the correct
1. See Brad Stone, In Price War, E-Readers Go Below $200, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/technology/
22reader.html?ref=technology.
2. See Sony’s PS3 Price Cut: Desperate, or Savvy Move?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug.
17, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/199254/20110817/sony-ps3-price-cutwii-xbox-360.htm.
3. See Forrest Hartman, What Is an Internet-Enabled TV?, ABOUT.COM, http:
//tv.about.com/od/frequentlyaskedquestions/f/InternetTVFAQ.htm (last visited
Sept. 11, 2011).
4. See Brian Cooley, Cadillac Rolls Out in-Car Internet Access, CNET REVIEWS
(Mar. 19, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-1019983348.html.
5. See, e.g., LG Internet Refrigerator, LG, http://us.lge.com/www/product
/refrigerator_demo.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
6. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13
(D. Minn. 2008) (involving an Internet user accused of illegal copyright
infringement after sharing music files); Scheff v. Bock, No. 03-022837, 2007 WL
6930518, at ¶ 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 25, 2007) (involving a lawsuit for defamation over
written material published on the Internet).
7. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 45 (2006) (“The absence of relatively
self-authenticating facts in cyberspace makes it extremely difficult to regulate
behavior there.”).
8. Although systems are being developed to expand the number of
authenticating facts—for example, Google has begun to look for suspicious
account activity, primarily by recording “the geographic region that [it] can best
associate with the access”—many online services have not yet implemented
advanced anti-fraud mechanisms. See Pavni Diwanji, Detecting Suspicious Account
Activity, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:15 AM),
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/03/detecting-suspicious-accountactivity.html. Furthermore, while sophisticated Online Service Providers (OSPs)
may employ such measures, third parties—such as other users—frequently lack
access to the wealth of data necessary for advanced identification processes.
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username and password, the Internet doesn’t doubt your identity.
Simply having a different username and password typically leads
9
the Internet to believe that you are a different person altogether.
That anonymity makes many of the problems mentioned
above much more difficult to resolve. Without a clearly identifiable
defendant, a plaintiff has little chance of recovery, and while
anonymous defendants are not a phenomenon unique to the
Internet, the prevalence of the Internet in modern society has
10
exacerbated this problem. This article explores the mechanisms
available to discover the identity of an otherwise anonymous
Internet user, and discusses the complications—forum selection,
service and notice, limited litigation tools available to anonymous
defendants, opportunities for abuse, and burdens placed on
disinterested third parties—inherent in litigating against an
anonymous Internet defendant. In particular, the authors seek to
call attention to the inequitable treatment of anonymous Internet
defendants, as exemplified by the limitations placed on them
during litigation, the ease with which procedural abuses can be
inflicted upon them, the complicity of otherwise disinterested third
parties in ignoring the privacy rights of anonymous Internet
defendants, and the continued neglect—of both judicial and
legislative bodies—in addressing such issues. To rectify the
prejudicial and damaging atmosphere to which anonymous
Internet defendants are subjected, four requirements must be
diligently enforced: (1) courts must require complaints to comply
fully with pleading rules, including those regarding propriety of
jurisdiction and venue; (2) indications and allegations of counterfacts—particularly those that tend to destroy jurisdiction and
venue—must be addressed early and with all due seriousness; (3)
there must be fastidious observation of joinder rules, such that
permissive joinder and dismissal can no longer be abused to the
detriment of anonymous Internet defendants; and (4) effective
notice must be given to putative defendants.

9. See, e.g., Paul Cockerton, Time to End Our Reliance on Unique Users, PAUL
COCKERTON (July 2, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://paulcockerton.wordpress.com/2011/
07/02/time-to-end-the-reliance-on-unique-users/.
10. See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 323 (2008) (“From anonymous message boards
criticizing massive corporations, to citizens who scrutinize elected officials, to
websites that enable the anonymous release of government and corporate
documents, the Internet has expanded the cape of anonymity to shield an army of
pamphleteers.”).
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II. THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ANONYMOUSLY
An oft-quoted passage from McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, explaining the justifications for anonymous speech,
reads:
Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic
discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities
frees them to express critical, minority views . . .
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . .
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights,
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of
11
an intolerant society.
As the above passage suggests, there is a right to anonymity. This
section
will
examine
the
justifications—constitutional,
jurisprudential, and societal—supporting the right to be
anonymous and the right to speak anonymously. Although these
12
rights have long since been established, a clear understanding of
the scope and extent of their reach is necessary for proper
understanding of the plight of the anonymous defendant, and the
import of the rights that he or she is made to surrender under our
current procedural scheme.
The Supreme Court cases that have discussed anonymous
speech have for the most part noted that it has been protected
13
because there is a valuable tradition in protecting speech. Many
cases note that famous authors and our Founding Fathers wrote
anonymously to protect themselves from retribution, or simply to
14
The Court has stated that “an author’s
protect their privacy.
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of
15
and that
speech protected by the First Amendment,”
16
“[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”
In many of these cases, dissenting jurists have pointed out that
there should be no broad right to anonymity. For example, Justice
Scalia in McIntyre stated that “[anonymity] facilitates wrong by
eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of
11. Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues
/anonymity (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)).
12. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343.
13. Id.
14. E.g., id.
15. Id. at 342.
16. Id. at 357 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 3–4 (R. McCallum ed. 1947)).
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the anonymity.”
Determining who is wrongfully avoiding
accountability and who is rightly avoiding unfair retribution is
difficult, but there should be some clear procedural rules to guide
judges in determining when unmasking anonymous parties is fair
game.
A. Anonymity as a Protection from Retaliation
Unpopular speech is always in great need of protection and
18
anonymity. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, an Alabama
corporations law required disclosure of membership lists of the
19
In a unanimous decision, the Court stated that
NAACP.
anonymity is tied to the rights of free speech and free association,
and that, in this circumstance, disclosure would have a chilling
20
The Court recognized that many residents of Alabama
effect.
who normally would associate with the NAACP might not do so if
21
“[I]mmunity from state
their association was publicly known.
scrutiny of [Petitioner’s] membership lists . . . is here so related to
the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests
privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come
22
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
23
In Talley v. California, a Los Angeles ordinance forbade
anonymous posters and advertisements in an effort to curb false
24
Handbills were distributed that
advertising, libel, and fraud.
urged the boycott of several businesses and businessmen who did
not offer equal employment opportunities to “Negroes, Mexicans,
25
The handbills had the address of “National
and Orientals.”
Consumers Mobilization” printed on them but did not list any
26
Because the ordinance was not limited to
person’s name.
offensive or obscene advertising and was not solely curbing fraud as
it claimed, the Supreme Court held that it was an infringement of
27
free speech. There was no showing of a problem with libelous or
17. Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
19. Id. at 451.
20. Id. at 466.
21. Id. at 462.
22. Id. at 466.
23. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
24. Id. at 60–61, 64.
25. Id. at 61.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 64 (“[A]s in Griffin, the ordinance here is not limited to handbills
whose content is ‘obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful
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fraudulent handbills, so the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to
28
protect speech. However, the dissent noted that there was also no
29
The
clear showing of a threat of retribution to the speakers.
decision in Talley has paved the way for broad protection of
anonymous speech because it can be assumed that in speech that
criticizes, whether political or not, there is a potential for
retribution, and an author has the right to protect his or her
identity if he or she chooses.
30
In Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, the
Supreme Court carved out an exception for anonymous speech
from the general rule on campaign contribution disclosures set out
31
The Court held that Ohio’s campaign
in Buckley v. Valeo.
disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to
32
If either
minor parties such as the Socialist Workers Party.
contribution or involvement was publicized, contributors and
recipients would be subject to harassment and reprisals—
specifically, those associated with the Socialist Workers Party feared
33
that they would be fired or denied employment in the future.
This contrasts with the general rule of Buckley that the state interest
in fair elections outweighs any need for anonymity in campaign
34
contributions.
The Brown case highlights the flexibility available for decisions
involving political speech. When there is a risk of chilling speech
because of retribution to speakers based on their views, there can
and should be exceptions to protect those speakers with unpopular
or minority viewpoints.
B. Anonymity and Compelled Identification in the Political Arena
The case that is most often cited for the proposition that there
is a right to speak anonymously is McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
35
Commission. In 1988, Margaret McIntyre passed out leaflets that

conduct.’ . . . Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to
prevent these or any other supposed evils.” (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 451 (1938))).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 69 (Clark, J., dissenting).
30. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. Brown, 459 U.S. at 101–02.
33. Id. at 99.
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72.
35. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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were meant to persuade people to vote against a school levy. The
leaflets were signed “CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS,”
and argued that the local school district had wasted money in
previous levies and that “WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE
37
Ohio law, at the time, prohibited anonymous
TOLERATED.”
political advertisements promoting a candidate or issue that would
38
be decided in an upcoming election. The scope of the law in
McIntyre was narrower than the law in Talley because the Ohio law
only applied to speech intended to influence the outcome of an
election, and the alleged state interest was to prevent libel and
39
fraud and provide the electorate with relevant information.
The Court held that the exacting scrutiny standard was not
40
met by the Ohio law. When political speech is involved, any law
that would restrict that speech must be narrowly tailored to a
41
The majority also noted the great
compelling state interest.
tradition of anonymous political speech as well as anonymous
42
literature. “The right to remain anonymous may be abused when
it shields fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its nature will
sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our
society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to
43
In a concurring opinion, Justice
the dangers of its misuse.”
Thomas wrote that the text of the First Amendment must have
been intended to protect anonymous speech at the time it was
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 338. The applicable provision reads:
No person shall write, print, post or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement,
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed
to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in
any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of financing
political communications through newspapers, magazines, outdoor
advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of general
public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed matter, unless there appears on such form of
publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement
the name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer,
or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who
issues, makes or is responsible therefor.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988).
39. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344, 348.
40. Id. at 347.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 357.
43. Id.
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written because many of the founders in fact practiced anonymous
44
However, Justice Scalia’s dissent noted that forty-nine
speech.
states have laws that prohibit anonymous speech in campaigns, and
there is nothing in the text of the Constitution that explicitly
45
provides a right to anonymity.
McIntyre has been one of the most-cited cases dealing with
anonymity, and it contains at least two methods of looking at the
question of anonymous speech. First, it notes that there is a
46
tradition of protecting anonymous speech in our country. This
tradition is based on a deference given to authors to choose
whether to identify themselves because that is a part of the message
being conveyed, meaning that requiring identification is compelled
47
speech. The other method is to consider whether identification
of an author will have an effect on whether the speech is made at
48
all. If self-identification is required, some may be less likely to
49
speak, which would create an infringement of speech.
50
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the
Supreme Court struck down Colorado laws that required initiativepetitioners to be registered voters and to wear a name-badge stating
whether they were paid or volunteer, and to provide a list of all
51
Even though the petitioners would not be
paid workers.
anonymous to those who knew them, the Court held that they had
the right not to disclose their identities through identification
52
badges.
The right to be anonymous while publicly canvassing and
promoting a cause has been reaffirmed in Watchtower Bible v.
53
Stratton. In that case, the Village of Stratton prohibited canvassing
54
Again, part of the
on residential properties without a permit.
decision rested on the right to maintain anonymity while exercising
55
First Amendment rights.
If the Supreme Court has made anything clear in its decisions
44. Id. at 358–61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 385 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
46. Id. at 357.
47. Id. at 342.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 355.
50. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
51. Id. at 186, 200.
52. Id. at 200.
53. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002).
54. Id. at 154.
55. Id. at 167.
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over the last half-century, it is that there is some protection for
56
Of the
anonymity in the context of the First Amendment.
Internet cases discussed below, few involve compelled disclosure,
but rather a choice as to whether to allow an anonymous person to
57
be identified after alleged wrongful acts have occurred. Still, the
Supreme Court cases discussed above can provide several helpful
ideas about anonymity. Anonymity is to be protected when not
58
doing so would impair the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Anonymity can be protected because compelling disclosure is
equivalent to compelling speech, and there is a strong tradition of
anonymous political speech that can be traced to our nation’s
59
founding.
III. INEQUITABLE TREATMENT OF ANONYMOUS DEFENDANTS
This section will present the processes and procedures used to
unmask anonymous defendants and will then explore the problems
to which such practices give rise. These problems have persisted
60
for some time, and their net effect is the unfair and inequitable
61
treatment of defendants who wish to remain anonymous.
Unfortunately, that disparity exists at nearly every stage in
litigation, making it almost impossible for an anonymous
defendant to retain his or her rights to privacy and anonymity.
At present, anonymous defendants are faced with several
unique hurdles during litigation.
For example, while an
anonymous plaintiff who wishes to remain anonymous during the
course of a suit is armed with the full repertoire of procedural tools
62
necessary for full and vigorous litigation, an otherwise anonymous
56. See, e.g., id. at 167; Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S.
182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
57. See discussion infra Part III.A.
58. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 167.
59. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (“Under our Constitution, anonymous
pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy and of dissent.”).
60. See, e.g., Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885 (1996) (explaining that
litigants in English courts began using pseudonyms more than three centuries
ago).
61. See id. at 894–907.
62. See, e.g., Aaron Morris, Dude, Who’s My Plaintiff?—Courts Allow Anonymous
Plaintiffs, BUS. L. ALERT (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.businesslawalert.com/2008/12
/articles/defamation/dude-whos-my-plaintiff-courts-allow-anonymous-plaintiffs/
(“On August 12, 2008, the Second District U.S. Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
national and local trend toward recognizing a litigant’s right to proceed
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defendant seeking to protect that anonymity has his or her arsenal
limited to motions to quash subpoenas seeking to discover
63
information about his or her identity. Furthermore, proceedings
deciding whether to disclose the defendant’s identity are instigated
at the whim of the plaintiff, often in the improper forum, with
inadequate service and notice, and with only the barest effort
expended to ascertain whether the soon-to-be-identified defendant
64
is the proper party against whom suit should be brought.
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are largely silent or
65
unclear on the matter of anonymous defendants, leaving various
jurisdictions to develop different methods for dealing with
66
Unfortunately, although the difficulties
anonymous parties.
67
facing anonymous defendants have long been known, modern
pleading and discovery rules remain inadequate to address and
68
resolve these problems.
A. How Anonymous Defendants Are Identified
Anonymous defendants come in varying degrees of anonymity.
69
In BitTorrent piracy cases, for example, defendants are often
anonymously through the courts.”).
63. This is due to the procedural stage of the suit at the time when the
defendant’s identity is at risk of disclosure. Greater detail is provided in the
discussion infra Part III.A. See also Potential Legal Challenges to Anonymity, CITIZEN
MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/potential
-legal-challenges-anonymity (last updated Apr. 22, 2010) (“[Defendants] also have
the legal right to contest a subpoena seeking to reveal [their] identity. [They]
usually do this by filing a ‘motion to quash’ the subpoena . . . .”).
64. See VPR Internationale v. Does 1–1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64656, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (“In this case, not a single one of the
plaintiff’s 1,017 potential adversaries has been identified. There is no adversarial
process yet. Moreover, VPR ignores the fact that IP subscribers are not necessarily
copyright infringers.”).
65. See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332,
341–45 (D.D.C. 2011) (discussing the issue of whether mass joinder of anonymous
defendants is addressed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
66. Compare Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 445–56 (Md.
2009) (imposing stringent requirements prior to identification of anonymous
individuals, including an assessment of the strength of the underlying defamation
case), with Donkeyball Movie, LLC, v. Does 1–171, No. 10–1520 (BAH), 2011 WL
1807452, at *2–8 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (“[T]he putative defendant’s First
Amendment right to anonymity . . . is minimal and outweighed by the plaintiff’s
need for putative defendant’s identifying information in order to protect its
copyrights.”).
67. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 60, at 885.
68. Id. at 913–45.
69. BitTorrent is a popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocol, whereby files
are broken into small pieces and distributed in such a way that recipients can
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initially identified by an Internet Protocol (IP) address, which is
necessarily distributed to fellow users in order to facilitate file
sharing. In other instances, such identifying information may be
71
unavailable and the defendant may actually be truly anonymous.
Because the focus of this article is on the treatment of defendants
who are at risk of identification, more attention will be given to
those defendants that are less than fully anonymous.
Where some potentially identifying information is available,
plaintiffs may use that information to name defendants
pseudonymously, employing the discovery process to further
72
identify defendants. Often in the case of Internet defendants, the
true identity of the party corresponding to the potentially
identifying information can be obtained from a third-party online
service provider (OSP), such as an Internet service provider (ISP),
forum administrator, message board operator, e-mail provider, or
73
online merchant. Frequently, these OSPs record some amount of
74
For example, an e-mail
information to facilitate identification.
provider may log the IP address of the sender while the ISP that
supplied that IP address records to which of its subscribers the IP
75
address had been assigned. Thus, through a bit of detective work,
it may be possible to obtain the name and address for an online
76
service user.
often obtain them from fellow downloaders, rather than the source, thereby
easing the burden on the original uploader. See The Basics of BitTorrent,
BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/help/manual/chapter0201 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2011).
70. An IP address is a unique number assigned to each device on a network
used to direct network traffic to and from the correct device. IP Address Overview:
The Basics on IP Addresses, THE INTERNET DIG. (Oct. 25, 2004), http://
www.theinternetdigest.net/articles/ip-address-overview.html.
IP addresses are
frequently provided by those who supply access to the Internet, known as internet
service providers. See id.
71. See Roberto Aringhieri et al., Fuzzy Techniques for Trust and Reputation
Management in Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Systems, 57 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
528, 529 (2006).
72. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 390 n.2 (1971).
73. See Information Stored by Third Parties, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE PROJECT,
https://ssd.eff.org/3rdparties (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
74. See id.
75. H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4(h) (2011) (“A provider of an electronic
communication service or remote computing service shall retain for a period of at
least 18 months the temporarily assigned network addresses the service assigns to
each account, unless that address is transmitted by radio communication (as
defined in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934).”).
76. It may not be possible to accurately identify the proper plaintiff from the
IP address alone, because multiple persons—authorized or not—may be sharing
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In practice, first, the plaintiff sues a fictitious “John Doe.”
The plaintiff then obtains the court’s permission to subpoena
78
Once the
identifying information from the relevant OSPs.
plaintiff obtains such information from the OSPs, the plaintiff
79
amends the complaint to name the person identified by the OSPs.
Frequently, the OSPs will notify the relevant person that the
80
plaintiff is trying to obtain his or her information. If the person
whose identity is to be revealed objects to such disclosure, he or she
81
This is
is limited to filing a motion to quash the subpoena.
82
because he or she is technically not yet a party to the action, and
therefore does not have access to all the tools of litigation, such as
83
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. In practice, this
leaves a would-be defendant without any way to protect his or her
privacy until it has already been invaded.
If the motion to quash is unsuccessful, the court may hold a
hearing, during which the defendant can more fully oppose
84
It should be
disclosure of his or her identifying information.
the same Internet connection. See, e.g., Carolyn Thompson, NY Child Pornography
Case Underscores Wi-Fi Privacy Dangers, AOL NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011), http://
www.aolnews.com/2011/04/24/ny-child-pornography-case-underscores-wi-fiprivacy-dangers/ (“People who keep an open wireless router won’t necessarily
know when someone else is piggybacking on the signal, which usually reaches
300–400 feet . . . .”).
77. Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking “Anon12345”: Applying an Appropriate
Standard When Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation
Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 (citing McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d
259, 262–63 (D. Mass. 2006)).
78. Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011 WL
1807452, at *9 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (“To be clear, at this stage in the
proceedings, the plaintiff is engaged in discovery to identify the proper defendants
to be named in this lawsuit, including whether the exercise of jurisdiction over
each potential defendant is proper.”).
79. See id. at *1 (stating that the plaintiff had been given leave “to obtain
identifying information for the putative defendants” because the defendants “were
unidentified at the time the plaintiff filed its Complaint”).
80. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the court ordered the putative defendants’
OSPs to send notices to them so the defendants could challenge the release of
their information).
81. Id. at *9 (“If and when the putative defendant is ultimately named in this
lawsuit, she will have the opportunity to file an appropriate motion challenging
the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Court will be able to evaluate her personal
jurisdiction defense and consider dismissal. Until that time, however, dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(2) is inappropriate.” (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180–81 (D. Mass. 2008))).
82. See McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[T]his
motion must be considered ex parte because John Doe is not known.”).
83. See Donkeyball Movie, 2011 WL 1807452, at *8–9.
84. Lewis, supra note 77, at 954.
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noted that this hearing is held in the court initially selected by the
plaintiff when filing suit, which occurred before the plaintiff had
85
ascertained the identity of the defendant; thus, a host of defects
86
with respect to jurisdiction, venue, and notice may exist. These
87
issues will be discussed later in this section.
Courts have struggled to reach a consistent approach in
deciding whether to allow plaintiffs to use discovery to identify the
88
Seeking to balance the interests of the
putative defendant.
plaintiff with those of the defendant and to provide opportunities
for redress without “demand[ing] the court system unmask every
89
insolent, disagreeable, or fiery anonymous online figure,” two
90
The more recent—and more
standards have emerged.
exacting—of the two was put forth by the Delaware Supreme Court
91
The older standard was
in its 2005 Doe v. Cahill decision.
articulated by the Virginia Circuit Court in In re Subpoena Duces
92
Tecum to America Online, Inc. in 2000.
The America Online standard requires that the plaintiff have a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for jurisdiction where the suit was
filed, and that the identity of the putative defendant is necessary for
93
litigation. In contrast, the Cahill standard requires that: (1) the
plaintiff must provide notice of his discovery request by replying to
the original message; and (2) the plaintiff must support his claim
94
with sufficient facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., id. (mentioning that if a plaintiff files in federal court based on
diversity of citizenship, and the defendant, upon revealing himself, turns out to be
a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, then diversity is defeated).
87. See infra Parts III.B–C.
88. See Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All
Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2007) (“Courts . . . have applied different standards for
determining whether an anonymous source should be unmasked . . . .”).
89. McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
90. Lewis, supra note 77, at 954.
91. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); see also Kevin McBride, Discovery of Anonymous
Online Speakers, MCBRIDE L., PC (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.mcbride-law.com
/2011/03/08/discovery-of-anonymous-online-speakers (“The district court in the
9th Circuit matter on appeal applied the most exacting standard, established by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill. The Cahill standard requires
plaintiffs to be able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment and give, or
attempt to give, notice to the speaker before discovering the anonymous speaker’s identity.”)
(citation omitted).
92. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (2000), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am.
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
93. Id.
94. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
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The Cahill court expressly rejected the America Online standard
because “[America Online’s] ‘good faith’ standard is too easily
satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant’s right to speak
95
anonymously.” Legal commentators have also noted that neither
the America Online court nor any other has ever explained how one
96
satisfies the good faith basis requirement. Given the difficulties
involved in applying the America Online standard, courts have been
97
employing the Cahill standard with greater frequency.
Regardless of the standard applied, it appears that courts are
generally willing to allow the plaintiff to proceed with expedited
98
discovery so as to uncover the identity of the would-be defendant.
This trend appears to be slowing, however, with respect to cases
with multiple anonymous Internet defendants—so-called “reverse
99
Although
class action” cases—such as in Internet piracy cases.
these cases are recent (within the past year and some currently
100
undecided and subject to appeal), several legal commentators
suggest that such a shift may signal that the judiciary has come to
101
understand the plight of the anonymous defendant.
B. Issues with Pleadings
Initiating a case with one or more anonymous parties presents
the problem of pleading unknown facts. For example, Rule
8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
pleading have “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
102
In the case of an anonymous
court’s jurisdiction . . . .”
95. Id. at 458.
96. See Lewis, supra note 77, at 957–58 (citing Martin, supra note 88, at 1228);
see also Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[The good
faith standard] offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good
faith and leaves the speaker with little protection.”).
97. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
98. See Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008)
(noting “the overwhelming number of cases where courts have . . . permitted
expedited discovery in circumstances similar to the present.”).
99. See, e.g., VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64656 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011); Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-800, No. 10
C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35406 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011); IO Group, Inc. v.
Does 1-435, No. C 10-04382 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14123 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2011).
100. See, e.g., VPR Internationale, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656.
101. See, e.g., Robert Z. Cashman, Dead on Arrival—Judge Did Not Allow Plaintiff
Attorneys to Subpoena the ISPs, FED. COMPUTER CRIMES (May 3, 2011), http://
torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/john-doe-lawsuit-denied-expediteddiscovery-no-access-to-isp-data/.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
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defendant, is it possible to plead ignorance or is it necessary to have
a good faith basis for proceeding in a particular court? Recent filesharing cases again provide examples of how courts have differing
interpretations of the rules and their procedural effects.
Some courts have responded to a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction by ruling that motions to dismiss are
premature until an anonymous defendant is named and served,
103
However, in cases
thereby allowing jurisdictional discovery.
where an anonymous defendant is known by an IP address, it may
be possible to approximately determine where the anonymous
defendant is located. IP geolocation is the practice of determining
a user’s geographical location through their IP address, and has
104
been available since 1999. A few courts have now recognized that
IP geolocation may provide sufficient information to indicate that
jurisdiction and venue are not appropriate where the IP addresses
appear to be coming from places outside the district where the case
105
has been filed.
The appropriate standard for pleadings should not have to
change due to the presence of an anonymous party. In cases
involving an anonymous party known only by a username, or with
no facts suggesting geographical location, it may be appropriate to
allow jurisdictional discovery in any district. However, at a
minimum, a party should be required to plead a good faith reason
to believe that, upon identification, the claims would survive a
106
Where a party knows only evidence that
motion to dismiss.
would contradict an allegation, such as the appropriateness of
venue, jurisdictional discovery seems inappropriate.
103. See, e.g., West Bay One, Inc. v. Does 1-1,653, 270 F.R.D. 13, 15 n.2 (D.D.C.
2010); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008);
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Does 1-35, No. CIV.A. 05-1918(CKK), 2006 WL
1028956, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2006).
104. See Stephanie Olsen, Digital Envoy Wins Geotargeting Patent, CNET NEWS
(June 29, 2004), http://news.cnet.com/Digital-Envoy-wins-geotargeting-patent
/2110-1032_3-5251844.html.
105. See, e.g., Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 11-cv-00301(RLW), 2011 WL
3240562, at *4 (D.D.C. July 29, 2011) (“Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a District of Columbia
resident if a geolocation service places his/her IP address within the District of
Columbia, or within a city located within 30 miles of the District of Columbia.
Without this threshold good faith showing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion for
expedited discovery inappropriate, as it would otherwise be based on Plaintiff’s
mere conjecture or speculation . . . .”).
106. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26,
37 (2000), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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C. Abuses of Process
In light of the disparity between courts and the inconsistent
application of standards—or rather, the lack of a consistent
standard—it comes as no surprise that anonymous defendants are
subjected to various abuses under the current scheme. Under our
justice system, anonymous Internet defendants are particularly
vulnerable because their desire to retain their anonymity often
107
compels them to strike unbalanced settlement agreements, to
108
refrain from responding to lesser abuses, and to neglect to use
the proper degree of discretion in seeking and retaining legal
109
Furthermore, in addition to the forum and notice
counsel.
110
deficiencies detailed in earlier sections, problems of which the
courts have long been cognizant, anonymous Internet defendants
107. See, e.g., Eryk Salvaggio & Kurt Klappenbach, File-Sharing Settlements Target
34 UMS Students, THE MAINE CAMPUS (Nov. 19, 2007), http://
mainecampus.com/2007/11/19/file-sharing-settlements-target-34-ums-students/
(discussing the impact of a bill that would link financial aid funding to a school’s
willingness to test technological deterrents to file-sharing, and noting that
“[w]hile this bill is working through Congress, the RIAA announced that 417 prelitigation settlement letters had been sent to college students nation-wide . . . .”);
see also Nate Anderson, P2P Lawyer: More Settlements Since Former-Lobbyist Judge’s
Ruling, ARS TECHNICA L. & DISORDER (Apr. 12, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011/04/p2p-lawyer-more-settlements-since-former-lobbyist-judgesruling.ars (“[M]ore anonymous P2P defendants are coming forward to settle.”).
But see David Kravets, Settlement Rejected in ‘Shocking’ RIAA File Sharing Verdict, WIRED
THREAT LEVEL (Jan. 27, 2010, 2:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/
01/settlement-rejected-in-shocking-riaa-file-sharing-verdict/ (“‘She is rejecting
[the RIAA’s settlement offer],’ Joe Sibley, one of Thomas-Rasset’s lawyers, said in a
telephone interview. ‘I think it proves our point. They want to use this case as a
bogeyman to scare people into doing what they want, to pay exorbitant
damages.’”).
108. See Paul Alan Levy, Litigating Civil Subpoenas to Identify Anonymous Internet
Speakers, 37 LITIGATION, no. 3, 2011 at 27, 30, available at http://www.citizen.org
/documents/litigating-civil-subpoenas-to-identify-anonymous-internet-apeakerspaul-alan-levy.pdf (“[T]he most common response [if the defendant has hired a
lawyer] on the part of the plaintiffs’ lawyers is either to drop the case or to file no
opposition [to the defendants’ motions to quash]. . . . What this tells me is that
these plaintiffs sought discovery to identify their critics without having any real
intention of going forward with [their] . . . case.”).
109. See David L. Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” is Due: Addressing the Legal
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 21 n.36 (2000) (“John Doe
defendants do not have the option of appearing pro se for two reasons. First, a
personal appearance would obviously negate a defendant’s efforts to conceal his
or her identity. Second, suits against John Does are frequently filed in
jurisdictions distant to the defendants. As a result, anonymous defendants who
wish to protect their identities are compelled to incur the expense of retaining
counsel to represent them (assuming they are able to locate counsel in a distant
jurisdiction on short notice).”).
110. See supra Part III.B.
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are saddled with additional procedural burdens and risks of less
obvious harms. Given the anonymous nature of the defendants,
plaintiffs are afforded a certain degree of freedom in the pleading
and discovery processes that necessarily invades the privacy of
111
would-be defendants after clearing notably low hurdles.
One of the more pernicious forms of abuse inflicted by
plaintiffs is the practice of voluntary dismissal, followed by
112
additional joinder. Under this practice, plaintiffs initially file suit
against a large number of anonymous defendants, and provide
113
Defendants can either
notice through the defendants’ OSPs.
wait until the plaintiff has availed itself of the discovery process and
uncovered their identity, or take on an active role in the action.
During this time, settlement offers are communicated from the
114
These settlement offers
plaintiff to the putative defendants.
typically demand that the defendant pay a sum of money, admit
fault, and agree to refrain from repeating the behavior, in
115
exchange for the plaintiff waiving his or her right to bring suit.
Once the plaintiff feels he or she has successfully reached as many
settlement agreements as are likely, or if the current crop of
defendants is particularly uncooperative, the plaintiff dismisses all
but a handful of defendants, and joins many more, repeating the
116
In this way, the plaintiff is able to avoid aggregating
process.
filing fees and costs while reaching the greatest number of
potential defendants (thereby accumulating the greatest amount of
117
settlement payments).
Particularly in mass file-sharing cases, plaintiffs have brought
suit against a multitude of defendants, with the only rationale for
the grouping being that the same copyrighted work was
118
In these suits, the defendants were often from
downloaded.
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. See, e.g., CP Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–300, No. 10 C 6255, 2011 WL
737761, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011).
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See, e.g., id.
116. See, e.g., id.
117. See, e.g., id. (“No predicate has been shown for thus combining 300
separate actions on the cheap—if CP had sued the 300 claimed infringers
separately for their discrete infringements, the filing fees alone would have
aggregated $105,000 rather than $350.”).
118. See, e.g., Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–60, No. C 11–01738 SI, 2011 WL
3652521, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Plaintiff claims that the Doe defendants
illegally reproduced and distributed plaintiff’s copyrighted creative work ‘A Punk
Rock Orgy in the Woods’ . . . .”).
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different states, downloaded the file at different times and from
different sources, and, in some instances, downloaded different
119
files. This would be analogous to joining separate and unrelated
crimes committed by separate and unrelated criminals simply
because the same model of television was stolen. Without a
120
substantial factual nexus, joinder is clearly improper, yet, because
121
the technology is complex, and due to the potentially high cost
122
of bringing similar suits against possibly thousands of defendants,
courts have been willing to permit such joinder during the early
123
stages of litigation.
Another abuse visited upon anonymous defendants is the
threat of identification and association with potentially
embarrassing or shameful practices.
For example, in CP
Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-300, the alleged harm was the defendants’
unauthorized downloading of a pornographic film titled “Cowgirl
124
Many similar cases exist wherein the plaintiff uses
Creampie.”
the potentially embarrassing nature of the material downloaded to
coerce settlement from the putative defendants who are at risk of
125
In situations like these, the plaintiff takes
being unmasked.
advantage of the considerable leverage afforded by the shame and
humiliation that would be inflicted upon the defendant were he or
119. Id. at *3–4.
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as
defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.”) (emphasis added).
121. See Call of the Wild Movie v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 345
(D.D.C. 2011) (“Given the administrative burden of simply obtaining sufficient
identifying information to properly name and serve alleged infringers, it is highly
unlikely that the plaintiffs could protect their copyrights in a cost-effective
manner.”); This is How We Catch You Downloading, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 14, 2007),
http://torrentfreak.com/this-is-how-we-catch-you-downloading/
(detailing
a
process used to trace users connecting to P2P networks).
122. See, e.g., CP Productions, 2011 WL 737761, at *1 (“[I]f CP had sued the 300
claimed infringers separately . . . the filing fees alone would have aggregated
$105,000 rather than $350.”).
123. See, e.g., VPR Internationale v. Does 1–17, No. C 11-01494 LB, 2011 WL
1465836, *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011).
124. 2011 WL 737761, at *1.
125. See Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Colo. Members of Swarm of Nov. 16,
2010 to Jan. 31, 2011, No. 11-cv-01171-WYD-KMT, 2011 WL 1812654, at *1−2 (D.
Colo. May 12, 2011) (permitting discovery for the purpose of identifying
defendants who allegedly downloaded gay pornography); see also Nate Anderson,
Meet Evan Stone, P2P Pirate Hunter, ARS TECHNICA L. & DISORDER (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/meet-evan-stone-p2p-piratehunter.ars.
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she to be associated with the allegedly infringed content. The
defendant has a strong incentive to settle in order to retain
anonymity—often accepting an otherwise disadvantageous offer—
even when he or she may have otherwise emerged victorious from
litigation.
A third form of abuse takes advantage not of the anonymous
126
defendants, but of the third parties. Because third-party ISPs can
be compelled by subpoena—indeed, most Internet service
providers will refrain from disclosing subscriber information absent
127
a court order —to assist in ascertaining the identity of those
associated with identifying information such as IP addresses, ISPs
may suffer a significant burden in assisting litigation for which they
have no interest in the outcome. Particularly where hundreds of
potential defendants are listed, ISPs may have to expend
considerable time, resources, and manpower to provide the
plaintiff with the requested information, as well as notify those
128
The use of the
whose information is at risk of disclosure.
discovery process in this way pits the ISPs against their customers
for the benefit of a party with whom the ISP may have had no
129
Additionally, where plaintiffs have done
previous association.
little or nothing to determine the propriety of jurisdiction with
126. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, NFL Fumbles DMCA Takedown Battle, Could Face
Sanctions, ARS TECHNICA UPTIME (Mar. 20, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/business
/news/2007/03/nfl-fumbles-dmca-takedown-battle-could-face-sanctions.ars
(discussing the National Football League’s abuse of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act takedown provisions by sending repeated takedown requests
regarding the same content).
127. Becky Waring, ISPs Assist in Cutting Off File-Sharing Users, WINDOWS SECRETS
(May 7, 2009), http://windowssecrets.com/top-story/isps-assist-in-cutting-off-filesharing-users (“[M]ost ISPs in the U.S. and other countries will release
information about subscribers only when presented with a court order . . . .”); see
also Office of Student Conduct, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, U. OF PENNSYLVANIA OFF. OF
STUDENT CONDUCT, http://www.upenn.edu/osc/pages/file_sharing.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011) (“[M]any ISPs will not share subscriber information with
copyright owners . . . .”).
128. See Evan Brown, Internet Law in the Courts, 14 J. INTERNET L. 32, 32–33
(2011) (“Prosecuting a case against thousands of copyright infringement
defendants is an enormous task, both for the plaintiffs’ attorneys as well as the ISPs
who must respond to the subpoenas. Having so many defendants risks making the
case unmanageable.”).
129. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 32
(2000) rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) (“If AOL did not uphold the
confidentiality of its subscribers, as it has contracted to do, absent extraordinary
circumstances, one could reasonably predict that AOL subscribers would look to
AOL’s competitors for anonymity. As such, the subpoena duces tecum at issue
potentially could have an oppressive effect on AOL.”).
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respect to its multiple defendants, the sting of this abuse is
compounded by the fact that much of the ISP’s efforts and
expenses may be for naught.
The fourth type of abuse is the use of court proceedings to
130
A plaintiff
identify a defendant where no legitimate claim exists.
can bring a false or tenuous claim solely for the purpose of
identifying the defendant, dropping the claim after the defendant
131
Such suits may have a chilling effect on otherwise
is called out.
free speech merely because those at risk of such suits are unwilling
or unable to expend the time and resources to defend against
132
Indeed, some litigants have
allegations, however meritless.
employed this strategy so successfully and so frequently as to have
133
such behavior lambasted in popular media.
A final form of abuse is the result of inadequate notice. While
134
some case law supports a notice requirement, other cases are
135
silent on the matter. Furthermore, even in those instances where
136
notice is required, such notice is often insufficient. For example,
the Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3 notice requirement is as
follows:
We hold that when such an application is made, the trial
court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts
to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject
of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure,
and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named
defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application. These notification efforts
130. Levy, supra note 108, at 3 (discussing how plaintiffs seek discovery to
identify their critics without having any real intention of going forward with their
case).
131. Id.
132. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
133. See South Park: Trapped in the Closet (Comedy Central television broadcast
Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-episodes
/s09e12-trapped-in-the-closet.
134. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky
v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,
460 (Del. 2005); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); Dendrite Int’l,
Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
135. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26
(2000) rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
136. See Matthew Nied, Protecting Internet Anonymity: The Case for Providing Notice
to Anonymous Defendants in Defamation Cases, L. IS COOL (Nov. 9, 2009),
http://lawiscool.com/2009/11/09/protecting-internet-anonymity-the-case-forproviding-notice-to-anonymous-defendants-in-defamation-cases.
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should include posting a message of notification of the
identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the
137
ISP’s pertinent message board.
Given the plaintiff’s lack of reliable identifying information for the
defendant, the Dendrite court required only that the plaintiff
provide indirect notice, by posting a message on the “pertinent
138
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that
message board.”
anonymous defendants will check—or indeed, are even aware of
the existence of—such message boards. As a result, a would-be
defendant may receive no notice of the proceedings in which his or
her privacy is at risk.
D. Third-Party Reactions When Subpoenaed
Most ISPs or website operators have little motivation to either
comply with a request to identify anonymous speakers (outside of a
duty to respond to a subpoena) or to use their resources in
protecting anonymous speakers. Some ISPs have had subpoenas
139
seeking the identities of anonymous parties successfully quashed,
140
However,
or have been granted additional time to respond.
these motions were apparently filed for the benefit of the ISPs, and
it would not be reasonable to assume that an ISP will file a motion
to quash a subpoena in most cases. An ISP may simply have
nothing to gain from costly legal defense.
Additionally, website operators have very little risk of liability
for most tort claims that would arise out of content created by an
anonymous third party because section 230 of the Communications
141
This law has
Decency Act shields them from such tort liability.
been read broadly enough in some circumstances so that a website
cannot be required to remove content even after a court has found
142
that content to be defamatory. Further, a website does not have a
137. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
138. Id.
139. LFP Internet Grp., LLC v. Does, No. 10-MC-122, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5534, at *3 (D.S.D. Jan. 20, 2011) (granting Midcontinent Communications, Inc.’s
motion to quash).
140. See Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBh & Co. KG v. Does 1-4,
577, No. 10-453 (RMC), 2010 WL 4905811, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2010) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for additional time to name and serve defendants while waiting
for information from ISPs).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). In particular, “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” Id. at (c)(1).
142. Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914–15 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d,
630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that internet website hosts could not be
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duty to keep records in order to obtain protection under section
230, though some legal scholars have recommended that adequate
143
record keeping be required in order to receive such immunity. If
the ISP or website operator cannot be sued, and has no useful
records to subpoena, a valid case may go nowhere against an
anonymous defendant.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the authors do not propose complete solutions to
these problems, the following recommendations are offered as
potential improvements that may alleviate some of the harm
inflicted on anonymous Internet defendants as a result of our
current system.
First, each part of the complaint—including jurisdiction and
venue—should be well-plead. Rather than a simple recitation that
“jurisdiction is believed to be proper,” plaintiffs bringing suit
against anonymous defendants should be required to plead some
facts as to why jurisdiction is proper. Functionally, parties should
be required to assert facts that tend to show the propriety of their
jurisdiction and venue selections.
One possible method of doing so would be for plaintiffs to use
IP geolocation.
Although still far from perfect, modern
144
geolocation is often accurate to approximately twenty-two miles,
and new techniques are emerging which are accurate to
145
While twenty-two miles may
approximately four-tenths of a mile.
not be enough to personally identify the user associated with a
specific IP address, it should oftentimes be sufficient to determine
proper jurisdiction and venue. Given the simplicity and negligible
146
the burden added by
expense involved with this practice,
forced to remove defamatory statements from their sites when the host is not a
party in the action); see also Mike Masnick, Two Courts Disagree on Whether or Not a
Website Can Be Forced to Remove User-Created Defamatory Content, TECHDIRT (Jan. 4,
2011, 4:30 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110102/00241112482/twocourts-disagree-whether-not-website-can-be-forced-to-remove-user-createddefamatory-content.shtml (explaining the decisions).
143. See David Thompson, Fixing the CDA 230 Subsidy While Preserving Online
Anonymity, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 10, 2010, 8:33 PM), http://
volokh.com/2010/06/10/fixing-the-cda-230-subsidy-while-preserving-onlineanonymity/.
144. YONG WANG ET AL., TOWARDS STREET-LEVEL CLIENT-INDEPENDENT IP
GEOLOCATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.usenix.org/event/nsdi11/tech
/full_papers/Wang_Yong.pdf.
145. Id. at 1–2.
146. See Lookup IP Address Location, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://
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requiring that plaintiffs take this small affirmative step is marginal
and far outweighed by the assurance that most anonymous
defendants will be subjected to suit only where jurisdiction and
venue exist, thus saving both judicial and party resources.
A second, related improvement would be to take seriously all
indications of counter-facts. Presently, courts often ignore the
anonymous defendant’s assertion that jurisdiction or venue is
147
and instead permit the plaintiff to proceed with
improper,
limited discovery for the purpose of determining the putative
148
defendant’s identity (thus enabling the jurisdictional inquiry).
Similarly, some plaintiffs have continued to press for disclosure of
identity even where facts, such as IP geolocation results, IP
addresses belonging to ISPs that do not offer services within the
district, or out-of-state letters from the would-be defendants’
attorneys asserting that jurisdiction is improper strongly suggest
149
Prohibiting
that jurisdiction or venue may be improper.
plaintiffs from proceeding where there are clear indications of
jurisdictional defects would save both judicial and party resources
and help to ensure that the proper court hears the matter. It
would also limit the kinds of strategic abuse detailed in earlier
150
sections and discourage parties who would be tempted to engage
in such practices by requiring them to make a good faith inquiry
where such indications are present.
Third, rules of joinder must be fastidiously observed in cases
with multiple anonymous Internet defendants. Courts must cease
to permit joinder in cases where traditionally required elements,
such as common instrumentalities, shared time and place, or
concerted efforts are conspicuously absent. Again, a more robust,
fact-based pleading requirement would serve to limit joinder in
cases where joining separate and distinct defendants would
normally be improper.
Fourth, notice requirements must be improved to guarantee
that putative defendants receive actual notice of proceedings
whatismyipaddress.com/ip-lookup (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (providing a tool
designed to give additional information for specific IP addresses).
147. See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011
WL 1807452, at *4 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that joinder “of unknown
parties identified only by IP addresses is proper” under Rule 20(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
148. See id. at *4–7 (finding joinder proper at the early stage of litigation, even
where movant’s assertion of misjoinder may be meritorious).
149. Id.
150. See supra Part III.C.
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concerning their privacy. One possible way to ensure that those
involved receive notice would be to create a formal requirement for
OSPs to provide such notice to their subscribers. Unfortunately,
such a process would rely on uninvolved and disinterested third
parties, which may not be enough to safeguard the rights of wouldbe defendants. However, because plaintiffs often lack the ability to
151
contact defendants directly, such notice and identity escrow may
be necessary if effective notice is to be given.
Finally, whatever procedural standards are applied to
unmasking anonymous defendants they should be applied equally
to different causes of action. Two anonymous defendants with
equally strong or weak cases, one accused of copyright
infringement and the other defamation, should have the same
odds of success on procedural matters.
Neither copyright
infringement nor defamation is protected speech, but if the
plaintiff cannot succeed in proving its case, both defendants may
be equally harmed by being identified.
V. CONCLUSION
None of the proposals from the foregoing section are novel; all
of the suggested methods are currently being employed by various
152
The
courts to resolve the very problems outlined in this article.
problem, then, is lack of unity. Where one court requires detailed
facts in order to assert jurisdiction in cases involving anonymous
153
defendants, another allows the plaintiff to proceed with identityrelated discovery before addressing the question of jurisdictional
154
155
Because the Internet spans the entire nation, the
propriety.
151. By their very nature, anonymous defendants are unknown, and thus lack
contact information.
152. See, e.g., Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–22, No. 11 C 2984, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49557, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2011) (“Steele and his client [should]
pursue the normal path of suing an identifiable (and identified) defendant or
defendants rather than a passel of ‘Does.’. . . Boy Racer is free to advance its
copyright infringement claims against one or more identified defendants on an
individual basis or, if appropriate, a plausible conspiracy theory.”); CP
Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–300, No. 10 C 6255, 2011 WL 737761 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24,
2011) (upholding previous order “dismissing the action without prejudice against
all 300 putative defendants” under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[T]he plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting
each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court
ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant.”).
153. Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 760–761.
154. See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1–171, No. 10-1520 (BAH), 2011
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law applied to the particular case—and therefore, the amount of
protection afforded to the defendant’s privacy—varies by the state
in which the plaintiff files suit, thereby encouraging forum
shopping. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that many of the
lawsuits brought against anonymous Internet defendants (e.g., filesharing and copyright infringement) have their cause of action
established by federal law, giving the plaintiff some leeway to pick
and choose among the courts to select one that is unsympathetic to
156
the privacy concerns of anonymous Internet defendants.
In light of the nationwide nature of the Internet, any solution
must be nationwide, as well. Unfortunately, state sovereignty makes
it difficult for different jurisdictions to reach a consensus, but as
states recognize the abuses inflicted upon anonymous Internet
defendants, they may come to adopt the solutions already found by
others. National agreement on measures designed to protect the
identities of anonymous Internet users that still affords plaintiffs
opportunities to unmask their opponents where genuine disputes
exist would go a long way towards leveling the playing field.

WL 1807452 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011).
155. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y,
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
156. At the time of writing, courts in the District of Columbia have tended to
fall in this category. See, e.g., Donkeyball Movie, 2011 WL 1807452.
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